Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The first stage of their stay in the DRA. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is the beginning of the end

Input card Soviet troops to Afghanistan.

The first reaction of the Soviet leadership was to send several thousand military advisers to Afghanistan. At the same time, Taraki was asked to remove Amin, whom the Soviet leadership, not without reason, suspected of having connections with the CIA. But Amin reacted faster. September 14, 1979 he stormed the presidential palace. Taraki was seriously wounded and died on 17 September. Preparations began for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The divisions located in the Central Asian republics were replenished and reinforced, mainly by Uzbeks and Turkmens. At the same time, the Soviet leadership tried to convince Amin to cede power to Babrak Karmal by the day the Soviet troops entered, but Amin categorically opposed this.

The Soviet invasion was modeled after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The first to land were December 24, 1979. at Bagram airfield, 50 km north of Kabul, part of the 105th Guards Airborne Division. At the same time, Soviet “advisers” neutralized Afghan units: under the pretext of replacing weapons, Afghan tanks were rendered unfit for action, communication lines were blocked, and management team The Afghan army is assembled for the holiday with the accompanying feast. On December 25 and 26, the entire 105th Division arrived in Bagram with the help of Il-76, An-22, and An-12 transport aircraft.

The critical day was December 27, 1979. While elements of the landing 105th Division rode their infantry fighting vehicles into Kabul and occupied key strategic points, other units surrounded the Daruloman Palace south of Kabul. A few days earlier, Lieutenant General Paputin, who was in Afghanistan, advised Amin to move there under the pretext of security. Paputin tried to persuade Amin to officially turn to the USSR for military assistance on the basis of the agreement concluded in December 1978. agreement and resign in favor of Karmal. Amin opposed this. After this, Alpha stormed the palace and killed Amin. Thus, the official call for help never materialized. From this moment on, the script began to differ more and more sharply from the Czech one. Karmal in all respects was simply a Soviet puppet. Despite the reforms and the release of a large number of prisoners, the population did not support B. Karmal. On the contrary, those who were accustomed to fighting against the invaders began to hate him. OK-CENTER, a multi-service for repairing phones, tablets, laptops and other equipment.

Simultaneously with the landing of the 105th Airborne Division, the 357th and 66th Motorized Rifle Divisions entered Afghanistan through Kushka and other border points. They occupied Herat and Farah in the west. At the same time, the 360th and 201st motorized rifle divisions, having set out through Termez, crossed the Amu Darya and advanced towards Kabul. The tanks of these divisions were transported on truck tractors. In February 1980, the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 58,000 people, and in mid-1980. The additional 16th and 54th motorized rifle divisions were introduced into Afghanistan. In addition, in the north of Afghanistan, a 100-kilometer security zone was created along the Soviet-Afghan border, where motorized maneuver and air assault groups (MMG and DShMG) of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out their tasks. In 1981 The 357th Division was replaced by the 346th Division and the 5th Motorized Rifle Division was additionally introduced into Afghanistan. In 1984 the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 135,000 - 150,000 people. In addition, there were another 40,000 soldiers stationed in the Asian republics, intended for special operations in Afghanistan or to provide logistical tasks.

The command of the 40th Soviet Army, which operated in Afghanistan, was for a long time near Bagram air base, 50 km north of Kabul. In 1983 The command post was moved to the outskirts of Kabul, and in 1984, due to the threat of shelling and attack, to the Soviet border and Termez. Seven Soviet motorized rifle divisions were positioned along the important Afghan ring road and on the road to Kiber Pass. The 105th Guards Airborne Division was located in the Bagram-Kabul area. One of the five airborne brigades included in this division was stationed in Jalalabad. The main supply depots were located on Soviet territory, in Kushka and Termez. In Afghanistan itself, the supply bases were: the Shindand air base between Herat and Farah, Bagram near Kabul, Abdalmir-alam near Kunduz and Kelagai on the Salang road. A fuel pipeline runs from the Soviet border to Kelagai. Near Termez, a combined road and railway bridge was built across the Amu Darya. The armament corresponded to that of conventional motorized rifle divisions. The AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers were also armed. There were 600 helicopters in Afghanistan, of which 250 were Mi-24. Su-25 aircraft were also involved in ground combat operations.

Afghan War (1979-1989) - military conflict in the territory Democratic Republic of Afghanistan(Republic of Afghanistan since 1987) between Afghan government forces and Limited contingent of Soviet troops on the one hand and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”) enjoying political, financial, material and military support leading NATO states and the conservative Islamic world on the other hand.

Term "Afghan War" implies a designation traditional for Soviet and post-Soviet literature and media for the period of military participation of the Soviet Union in the armed conflict in Afghanistan.

Convened soon UN Security Council at its meeting did not accept the anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States, the USSR vetoed it; it was supported by five Council member states. The USSR motivated its actions by the fact that the Soviet military contingent was introduced at the request of the Afghan government and in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation of December 5, 1978. On January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly at its Extraordinary Session adopted a resolution expressing “deep regret,” also expressing concern about the refugee situation and calling for the withdrawal of “all foreign troops,” but the resolution was not binding. Adopted by 108 votes to 14.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

On March 19, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev said: “The question was raised about the direct participation of our troops in the conflict that arose in Afghanistan. I think that... it’s not right for us to get drawn into this war now. We must explain... to our Afghan comrades that we can help them with everything they need... The participation of our troops in Afghanistan can harm not only us, but primarily them.”

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

Under the supervision of the CIA, they supplied weapons to anti-government armed groups. On the territory of Pakistan, in Afghan refugee camps, centers for special training of armed groups were deployed. Mainly, the program relied on the use of the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) as an intermediary to distribute funding, supply weapons and train Afghan resistance forces.

Further development of the situation in Afghanistan- armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle, and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA Nur Mohammad Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet leadership. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale, causing mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections in the 1960s with the CIA and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. It was considered as such Babrak Karmal, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim Battalion” - a special purpose detachment of the GRU - was sent to Bagram - specially created in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Division, which was assigned the role of the main impact force in upcoming events. The Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send troops .

According to the testimony of the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces USSR V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov actively opposed the introduction of troops, about which he had heated disputes with a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov.

On December 13, 1979, the Department of Defense Task Force for Afghanistan was formed. led by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S.F. Akhromeyev, who began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to the city of Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport planes and helicopters.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979.

At the same time, Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet troops. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Kh. Amin, but he remained alive, and Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, the “Muslim Battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the Amin Palace security brigade, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 special groups of the USSR KGB also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan Military District, the field command of the 40th Combined Arms Army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - 2 motorized rifle regiments, mixed air corps control, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. This was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take under protection important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979.

On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division was the first to be transported to the territory of the DRA. Following him, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion (4th Airborne Assault Battalion) of the 56th Airborne Brigade crossed, which was tasked with guarding the Salang Pass. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G. I. Shpak. During landing, one of the planes carrying paratroopers crashed.

The 103rd Division's backup was the 106th Guards Tula Airborne Division. The 103rd Airborne Division was transported to air bases on alert and additional ammunition and everything necessary were delivered there. The situation worsened due to the frost that hit. The 106th Airborne Division received full ammunition, while simultaneously conducting battalion exercises according to plan, and was withdrawn and transferred to take-off air bases in last days December. In particular, the reserve airfield in Tula and the MIG-21 air defense air base near Efremov were used. The breakdown by ship had already been carried out and the BMD turrets were removed from the external stops. Having stayed until January 10, 1980, at the air bases of the intended takeoff, units of the 106th Airborne Division were again returned in echelons to their places of deployment.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

The former head of the Illegal Intelligence Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Major General Yu. I. Drozdov, noted that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity, since the United States intensified its actions in the country (they concluded an agreement with China on Afghanistan, put forward their technical observation posts to the southern borders of the USSR). In addition, the USSR had sent its troops into Afghanistan several times before on a similar mission and did not plan to stay there for long. According to Drozdov, there was a plan for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980, prepared by him together with Army General S.F. Akhromeyev. This document was subsequently destroyed on the orders of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov.

Assault on Amin's palace and capture of secondary objects

The assault on Amin's palace - a special operation codenamed "Storm-333" , preceding the beginning of the participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan war of 1979-1989.

In the evening December 27 Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, the operation lasted 40 minutes, during the assault Amin was killed. By official version, published by the newspaper Pravda, “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, along with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people’s court and was executed.”

Amin's former residence, Taj Beg Palace, in 1987. Photo by Mikhail Evstafiev.

At 19:10, a group of Soviet saboteurs in a car approached the hatch of the central distribution center of underground communications communications, drove over it and “stalled out.” While the Afghan sentry was approaching them, a mine was lowered into the hatch and after 5 minutes an explosion occurred, leaving Kabul without telephone communication. This explosion was also the signal for the start of the assault.

The assault began at 19:30. local time. Fifteen minutes before the start of the assault, fighters from one of the groups of the “Muslim” battalion, driving through the location of the third Afghan guard battalion, saw that an alarm had been declared in the battalion - the commander and his deputies were standing in the center of the parade ground, and the personnel were receiving weapons and ammunition. A car with scouts from the “Muslim” battalion stopped near the Afghan officers, and they were captured, but the Afghan soldiers opened fire after the retreating car. The scouts of the “Muslim” battalion lay down and opened fire on the attacking guard soldiers. The Afghans lost more than two hundred people killed. Meanwhile, snipers removed the sentries from the tanks dug into the ground near the palace.

Then two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" of the "Muslim" battalion opened fire on the palace, and two more - on the location of the Afghan tank guard battalion in order to prevent its personnel from approaching the tanks. AGS-17 crews of the “Muslim” battalion opened fire on the location of the second guard battalion, preventing the personnel from leaving the barracks.

On 4 armored personnel carriers, KGB special forces moved towards the palace. One car was hit by Kh. Amin's guards. Units of the “Muslim” battalion provided the outer ring of cover. Having burst into the palace, the attackers “cleared” floor by floor, using grenades in the premises and firing from machine guns.

When Amin learned of the attack on the palace, he ordered his adjutant to inform the Soviet military advisers about it, saying: "The Soviets will help." When the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were attacking, Amin in a rage threw an ashtray at him and shouted “You’re lying, it can’t be!” Amin himself was shot during the storming of the palace (according to some sources, he was taken alive and then shot by virtue of an order from Moscow).

Although a significant part of the soldiers of the security brigade surrendered (in total about 1,700 people were captured), some of the brigade's units continued to resist. In particular, the “Muslim” battalion fought with the remnants of the third battalion of the brigade for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains.

Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj Bek Palace by KGB special forces groups with the support of paratroopers of the 345th Parachute Regiment, as well as the 317th and 350th regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, the general headquarters of the Afghan army, a communications center, KHAD buildings and Ministry of Internal Affairs, radio and television. Afghan units stationed in Kabul were blocked (in some places it was necessary to suppress armed resistance).

On the night of December 27-28 The new Afghan leader B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram under the protection of KGB officers and paratroopers. Radio Kabul broadcast an appeal from the new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed. The Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote on December 30 that “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, along with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people’s court and was executed.” Karmal praised the heroism of the KGB and GRU troops who stormed the palace, saying: “When we have our own awards, we will award them to all Soviet troops and security officers who participated in the fighting. We hope that the government of the USSR will award these comrades with orders.”

During the assault on Taj Beg, 5 KGB special forces officers, 6 people from the “Muslim battalion” and 9 paratroopers were killed. The leader of the operation, Colonel Boyarinov, also died. Almost all participants in the operation were wounded. Also, the Soviet military doctor Colonel V.P. Kuznechenkov, who was in the palace, died from friendly fire (he was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner).

On the opposite side, Kh. Amin, his two young sons and about 200 Afghan guards and military personnel were killed. The wife of Foreign Minister Sh. Vali, who was in the palace, also died. The widow Amina and their daughter, wounded during the assault, served several years in a Kabul prison, then left for the USSR.

The killed Afghans, including Amin's two young sons, were buried in a mass grave not far from the palace. Amin was buried there, but separately from the others. There was no tombstone placed on the grave.

Material from Wikipedia - the free encyclopedia

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the leadership of Afghanistan as a formal basis.

A limited contingent (OKSV) was directly involved in the flaring up in Afghanistan civil war and became an active participant.

This conflict involved the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka Shindand Kandahar, Termez Kunduz Kabul, Khorog Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units, divisions - 4, separate brigades - 5, separate regiments - 4, combat aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade 1 and some other units and institutions.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

April 14, 1988 With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan began May 15, 1988.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Losses:

According to updated data, the total in the war Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

The war in Afghanistan lasted almost 10 years, more than 15,000 of our soldiers and officers died. The number of Afghans killed in the war, according to various sources, reaches two million. And it all started with palace coups and mysterious poisonings.

On the eve of the war

A “narrow circle” of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which makes decisions on particularly important issues, gathered in the office Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in the morning of December 8, 1979. Those especially close to the General Secretary included USSR KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, the country's Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the party's chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov. This time, the situation in Afghanistan, the situation in and around the revolutionary republic was discussed, and arguments for sending Soviet troops into the DRA were considered.

It is worth recalling that Leonid Ilyich by that time had achieved the highest earthly honors on 1/6 of the planet, as they say, “I have achieved the highest power.” Five golden stars shone on his chest. Four of them are stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union and one of Socialist Labor. Here is the Order of Victory - the highest military award of the USSR, a diamond symbol of Victory. In 1978, he became the last, seventeenth cavalier to be awarded this honor, for organizing a radical change in World War II. Among the holders of this order are Stalin and Zhukov. In total there were 20 awards and seventeen gentlemen (three were awarded twice; Leonid Ilyich managed to surpass everyone here too - in 1989 he was deprived of the award posthumously). A marshal's baton, a golden saber, and a design for an equestrian statue was being prepared. These attributes gave him the undeniable right to make decisions at any level. Moreover, the advisers reported that Afghanistan could be turned into a “second Mongolia” in terms of loyalty to socialist ideals and controllability. To establish his leadership talent, party comrades advised the Secretary General to get involved in a small, victorious war. People were saying that dear Leonid Ilyich was aiming for the title of Generalissimo. But on the other hand, things were really not calm in Afghanistan.

The fruits of the April Revolution

On April 27-28, 1978, the April Revolution took place in Afghanistan (in the Dari language, this palace coup is also called the Saur Revolution). (True, since 1992, the anniversary of the April Revolution has been cancelled; instead, the Day of Victory of the Afghan people in jihad against the USSR is now celebrated.)

The reason for the opposition's protest against the regime of President Muhammad Dawood was the murder of a communist figure, a newspaper editor named Mir Akbar Khaibar. Daoud's secret police were accused of the murder. The funeral of an opposition editor turned into a demonstration against the regime. Among the organizers of the riots were the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Nur Mohamed Taraki and Babrak Karmal, who were arrested on the same day. Another party leader, Hafizullah Amin, was placed under house arrest for subversive work even before these events.

So, the three leaders are still together and they don’t have any particular disagreements, all three are under arrest. Amin, with the help of his son, then gave the order to the loyal PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) troops to start an armed uprising. There was a change of government. The President and his entire family were killed. Taraki and Karmal were released from prison. As we see, the revolution, or what we call a revolution, was easy. The military took the palace and eliminated the head of state, Daoud, and his family. That's all - power is in the hands of the “people”. Afghanistan was declared a Democratic Republic (DRA). Nur Mohammed Taraki became the head of state and prime minister, Babrak Karmal became his deputy, and the post of first deputy prime minister and foreign minister was offered to the organizer of the uprising, Hafizullah Amin. There are three of them so far. But the semi-feudal country was in no hurry to become imbued with Marxism and introduce the Soviet model of socialism on Afghan soil with dispossession, seizure of land from landowners, and the establishment of committees of the poor and party cells. Specialists from the Soviet Union were met with hostility by the local population. Local unrest began, turning into riots. The situation worsened, the country seemed to go into a tailspin. The triumvirate began to crumble.

Babrak Karmal was the first to be cleaned out. In July 1978, he was removed from office and sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, from where, knowing the complexity of the situation at home, he was in no hurry to return. A conflict of interests began, a war of ambitions between the two leaders. Soon, Hafizullah Amin began to demand that Taraki renounce power, although he had already visited Havana and Moscow, was warmly received by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, and enlisted his support. While Taraki was traveling, Amin prepared to seize power, replaced officers loyal to Taraki, brought troops subordinate to his clan into the city, and then, by decision of an extraordinary meeting of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, Taraki and his associates were removed from all posts and expelled from the party. 12 thousand Taraki supporters were shot. The case was set up like this: arrest in the evening, interrogation at night, execution in the morning. Everything is in Eastern traditions. Moscow respected traditions until it came to eliminating Taraki, who did not agree with the decision of the Central Committee to remove him from power. Having failed to achieve abdication through persuasion, again in the best traditions of the East, Amin ordered his personal guard to strangle the president. This happened on October 2, 1979. Only on October 9 was it officially announced to the people of Afghanistan that “after a short and serious illness, Nur Mohammed Taraki died in Kabul.”

Bad - good Amin

The murder of Taraki plunged Leonid Ilyich into sadness. He was nevertheless informed that his new friend died suddenly, not as a result of a short illness, but was treacherously strangled by Amin. According to the recollections of the then Head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence) Vladimir Kryuchkov“Brezhnev, being a man devoted to friendship, took Taraki’s death seriously and, to some extent, perceived it as a personal tragedy. He still had a feeling of guilt for the fact that it was he who supposedly did not save Taraki from imminent death by not dissuading him from returning to Kabul. Therefore, after everything that happened, he did not perceive Amin at all.”

Once, while preparing documents for a meeting of the Politburo commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, Leonid Ilyich told the employees: “Amin is a dishonest person.” This remark was enough to start looking for options to remove Amin from power in Afghanistan.

Moscow, meanwhile, received conflicting information from Afghanistan. This is explained by the fact that it was mined by competing departments (KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, various ministries).

The commander of the Ground Forces, Army General Ivan Pavlovsky, and the chief military adviser in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Lev Gorelov, using GRU data and information obtained during personal meetings with Amin, reported to the Politburo their opinion of the leader of the Afghan people as “a faithful friend and reliable ally of Moscow in the task of turning Afghanistan into an unshakable friend of the USSR." "Hafizullah Amin is strong personality and must remain at the head of the state.”

The KGB foreign intelligence channels reported completely opposite information: “Amin is a tyrant who unleashed terror and repression against his own people in the country, betrayed the ideals of the April Revolution, entered into a conspiracy with the Americans, is pursuing a treacherous line of reorienting foreign policy from Moscow to Washington, that he simply a CIA agent.” Although no one from the leadership of the KGB foreign intelligence service has ever presented real evidence of the anti-Soviet, treacherous activities of the “first and most faithful disciple of Taraki,” “leader of the April Revolution.” By the way, after the murder of Amin and his two young sons during the storming of the Taj Beg Palace, the widow of the revolutionary leader with her daughter and youngest son went to live in the Soviet Union, although she was offered any country to choose from. She said then: “My husband loved the Soviet Union.”

But let us return to the meeting on December 8, 1979, at which a narrow circle of the Politburo of the Central Committee gathered. Brezhnev is listening. Comrades Andropov and Ustinov argue for the need to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The first of them is the protection of the southern borders of the country from encroachments by the United States, which plans to include the Central Asian republics in its zone of interests, the deployment of American Pershing missiles on the territory of Afghanistan, which threatens the Baikonur Cosmodrome and other vital facilities, the danger of separation of the northern provinces and their annexation to Pakistan. As a result, they decided to consider two options: eliminate Amin and transfer power to Karmal, and send part of the troops to Afghanistan to carry out this task. Summoned to a meeting with the “small circle of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee” Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov for an hour he tries to convince the country's leaders of the harmfulness of the very idea of sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The marshal failed to do this. The next day, December 9, Ogarkov was again summoned to the General Secretary. This time in the office were Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Chernenko, who was assigned to keep the minutes of the meeting. Marshal Ogarkov persistently repeated his arguments against the introduction of troops. He referred to the traditions of the Afghans, who did not tolerate foreigners on their territory, and warned about the likelihood of our troops being drawn into fighting, but everything turned out to be in vain.

Andropov reprimanded the marshal: “You were not invited to listen to your opinion, but to write down the Politburo’s instructions and organize their implementation.” Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev put an end to the dispute: “We should support Yuri Vladimirovich.”

So a decision was made that had a grandiose result that would lead to the final straight of the collapse of the USSR. None of the leaders who made the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan will see the tragedy of the Soviet Union. The terminally ill Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, Chernenko, having started a war, left us in the first half of the 80s, without regretting what they had done. In 1989, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko will die.

Western politicians also influenced the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. By decision of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers on December 12, 1979, a deployment plan was adopted in Brussels Western Europe new American medium-range missiles Cruz and Pershing 2. These missiles could hit almost the entire European part of the USSR, and we had to defend ourselves.

Final decision

It was on that day - December 12 - that the final decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The Special Folder of the CPSU Central Committee contains the minutes of this meeting of the Politburo, written by the Secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko. It is clear from the protocol that the initiators of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko. At the same time he kept silent the most important fact, that the first task that our troops will have to solve will be the overthrow and elimination of Hafizullah Amin and replacing him with the Soviet protege Babrak Karmal. Therefore, the reference to the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory was carried out at the request of the legitimate government of the DRA is hardly justified. All members of the Politburo voted unanimously for the deployment of troops. However, it is noteworthy that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin was absent from the Politburo meeting, who, knowing the state of the country’s economy and being a highly moral person, categorically spoke out against the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. It is believed that from that moment on he had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

Twice poisoned Amin

On December 13, an agent of the illegal intelligence service of the KGB, headed by Major General Yuri Drozdov, a certain “Misha”, fluent in Farsi, joined a local special operation to eliminate Amin. His surname Talibov appears in specialized literature. He was introduced into Amin’s residence as a chef, which speaks of the brilliant work of illegal agents in Kabul and General Drozdov himself, a former resident in the United States. For the Afghan operation he will be awarded the Order of Lenin. A glass of poisoned Coca-Cola drink prepared by “Misha” and intended for Amin was accidentally given to his nephew, counterintelligence chief Asadullah Amin. First aid for poisoning was provided to him by Soviet military doctors. Then, in critical condition, he was sent to Moscow. And after being cured, he was returned to Kabul, where he was shot on the orders of Babrak Karmal. The power had changed by that time.

Chef Misha's second attempt will be more successful. This time he did not spare the poison for the entire group of guests. This bowl only passed Amin’s security service, since it was fed separately and the ubiquitous “Misha” with his ladle did not get there. On December 27, Hafizullah Amin hosted a sumptuous dinner on the occasion of receiving information about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. He was assured that the Soviet leadership was satisfied with the stated version of Taraki’s sudden death and the change in the country’s leadership. The USSR extended a helping hand to Amin in the form of sending troops. Afghanistan's military and civilian leaders were invited to dinner. However, during lunch many guests felt unwell. Some lost consciousness. Amin also passed out. The president's wife immediately called the Central Military Hospital and Clinic of the Soviet Embassy. The first to arrive were military doctors, colonels, therapist Viktor Kuznechenkov and surgeon Anatoly Alekseev. Having determined mass poisoning, they began resuscitation efforts to save Hafizullah Amin, who was in a coma. They finally pulled the president out of the other world.

One can imagine the reaction of foreign intelligence chief Vladimir Kryuchkov to this message. And in the evening, the famous operation “Storm-333” began - the assault on Amin’s Taj Beg palace, which lasted 43 minutes. This assault was included in the textbooks of military academies around the world. The assault to replace Amin with Karmal was carried out by the KGB special groups "Grom" - division "A", or, according to journalists, "Alpha" (30 people) and "Zenith" - "Vympel" (100 people), as well as the brainchild of military intelligence GRU - Muslim battalion (530 people) - 154th special forces detachment, consisting of soldiers, sergeants and officers of three nationalities: Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks. Each company had a Farsi translator, they were cadets of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. By the way, even without translators, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and some Turkmen spoke Farsi, one of the main languages of Afghanistan. The Soviet Muslim battalion was commanded by Major Khabib Khalbaev. The losses in the KGB special groups during the storming of the palace were only five. In the “Muslim battalion,” six were killed among the paratroopers. - nine people. Military doctor Viktor Kuznechenkov, who saved Amin from poisoning, died. By a closed decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, about 400 people were awarded orders and medals. Colonel Viktor Kuznechenkov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (posthumously).

The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or other government document on the deployment of troops never appeared. All orders were given verbally. Only in June 1980 did the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee approve the decision to send troops to Afghanistan. The fact of the assassination of the head of state began to be interpreted by the West as evidence of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This then greatly influenced our relations with the USA and Europe. Meanwhile, the United States nevertheless sent its troops into Afghanistan and the war there continues to this day - 35 years.

Photo at the opening of the article: on the Afghan border/ Photo: Sergey Zhukov/ TASS

ENTRY OF SOVIET TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN

Let us now turn to the events associated with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

On December 12, 1979, Resolution No. 176/125 of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was adopted. It was called: “To the situation in “A”, which meant - to the situation in Afghanistan.

Here is the text of the Resolution:

"1. Approve the considerations and measures (i.e., sending troops into Afghanistan) outlined by vol. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., Gromyko A. A.

Allow them to make adjustments of a non-fundamental nature during the implementation of these activities.

Issues requiring a decision by the Central Committee should be submitted to the Politburo in a timely manner. The implementation of all these activities is entrusted to comrade. Andropova Yu. V., Ustinova D. T., Gromyko A. A.

2. Instruct t.t. Andropov Yu.V., Ustinova D.T., Gromyko A.A. inform the Politburo of the Central Committee about the progress of the planned activities.

Secretary of the Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev.”

It became especially clear to our leadership that the deployment of troops was necessary with the coming to power in Afghanistan of X. Amin, when he began to commit atrocities against his own people, and also show treachery in foreign policy, which affected the interests of state security of the USSR. Our leaders were actually forced to send in troops.

What motivated them? Obviously, firstly, because it was necessary to prevent Amin’s repressions from rampant. It was an open extermination of the people; thousands of innocent people were executed every day. At the same time, not only Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazarians, Tatars, but also Pashtuns were shot. Extreme measures were taken in response to any denunciation or suspicion. The Soviet Union could not support such power. But the Soviet Union could not break off relations with Afghanistan due to this.

Secondly, it was necessary to exclude Amin’s appeal to the Americans with a request to send in their troops (since the USSR refuses). And this could have happened. Taking advantage of the current situation in Afghanistan and using Amin’s appeal, the United States could install its own monitoring and measuring equipment along the Soviet-Afghan border, capable of taking all parameters from prototypes of our missile, aircraft and other weapons, the testing of which was carried out at state testing sites in Central Asia. Thus, the CIA would have the same data as our design bureaus. Moreover, missiles (from a complex of shorter- and medium-range missiles, but strategic nuclear forces) aimed at the USSR would be deployed on the territory of Afghanistan, which, of course, would put our country in a very difficult situation.

When the Soviet leadership finally decided to send our troops into Afghanistan, under these conditions the General Staff proposed an alternative: to send troops, but to garrison large settlements and not to get involved in the fighting that took place on the territory of Afghanistan. The General Staff hoped that the very presence of our troops would stabilize the situation and the opposition would stop hostilities against government troops. The proposal was accepted. And the very entry and stay of our troops on the territory of Afghanistan was initially planned for only a few months.

But the situation developed completely differently than we expected. With the introduction of our troops, the provocations intensified. Although, in principle, the people of Afghanistan welcomed the entry of our troops. The entire population in cities and villages poured into the streets. Smiles, flowers, exclamations: “Shuravi!” (Soviet) - everything spoke of kindness and friendship.

The most vile provocative step on the part of the dushmans was the brutal, tortured murder of our officer-advisers in the artillery regiment of the 20th Infantry Division in the north of the country. The Soviet command, together with the military and political leadership of Afghanistan, was forced to take tough preventive measures. And the provocateurs were just waiting for that. And in turn, they carried out a series of bloody actions in many areas. And then military clashes spread throughout the country and began to grow like a snowball. Even then, a system of coordinated actions and centralized control of opposition forces was visible.

Therefore, the grouping of our troops from forty to fifty thousand, which were introduced initially (in 1979–1980), by 1985 began to number more than one hundred thousand. This, of course, included builders, repairmen, logistics workers, doctors, and other support services.

One hundred thousand - is it a lot or a little? At that time, taking into account the socio-political situation in Afghanistan itself and around it, this was exactly as much as was required to protect not only the most important objects of the country, but also oneself from attacks by rebel gangs and partially carry out measures to cover the state border with Pakistan and Iran ( interception of caravans, gangs, etc.). There were no other goals and no other tasks were set.

Later, some politicians and diplomats (and even military men) wrote that history condemned the Soviet Union for this step of sending troops into Afghanistan. I don't agree with this. It was not history that condemned, but a well-prepared and convincingly presented US propaganda campaign that forced the vast majority of countries in the world to condemn the Soviet Union. And the leadership of our country, carried away by the dilemma “to introduce - not to introduce,” did not care at all about this side of the matter, that is, about explaining not only the Soviet and Afghan people, but also the world, their goals and intentions. After all, we went to Afghanistan not with war, but with peace! Why did we have to hide it? On the contrary, even before the introduction it was necessary to widely communicate this to the peoples of the world. Alas! We wanted to stop the military clashes that were already there and stabilize the situation, but outwardly it turned out that we seemed to have brought war. They allowed the Americans, by their step, to mobilize the opposition as much as possible to fight both government troops and our units.

It is appropriate to return to the events in Vietnam. The whole world knew the Soviet-Vietnamese relations that took place before the US aggression. But then the United States attacked Vietnam. Undoubtedly, we, like other countries of the world, condemned this act. But we did not make these events dependent on relations between the USSR and the USA. And Carter suddenly poses the question categorically: the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is unacceptable for the United States, and this is a precondition for our further negotiations on the problem of reducing nuclear weapons (?!).

This “amazing” position becomes even stranger if we remember at least one more fact from the Vietnamese set: the United States is bombing Hanoi, and Nixon flies to Moscow on an official visit, the leadership of the USSR does not cancel his reception. Really strange.

And in general one wonders why White House so mad? Is aggression against Vietnam permissible for the United States? Is it also possible to commit aggression against Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Grenada, Panama?! But the Soviet Union, at the request of the leadership of Afghanistan, is not allowed to send its troops into this country, even if there are contractual relations?

This is the policy of double standards.

Take 1989. After the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, the United States instantly lost interest in the Afghan problem, although, if you believe the pompous statements of American politicians, starting with presidents, the United States seemed to be in favor of peace on the soil of Afghanistan and for providing assistance to the long-suffering people of this country. So where is it all? Instead, the Americans set the Taliban against the people of Afghanistan, supporting them in every possible way with finances and weapons.

I return to the events of 1979. In order to ensure the entry of our troops into Afghanistan, our military command decided: to transfer in advance small operational groups with communications equipment to Kabul and other cities where it was planned to introduce formations of the Ground Forces or land units of airborne troops. These were mainly special forces units. In particular, to ensure our actions, a task force led by Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov was sent to the airfields of Bagram (70 km north of Kabul) and Kabul. Subsequently, he took over an entire airborne division and a separate parachute regiment. It should be of interest to the reader that to transport one airborne division, about four hundred transport aircraft of the IL-76 and AN-12 type (and partly Antey) are required.

The entire deployment of troops on the spot, in the Turkestan Military District, was directly led from the Ministry of Defense by S. L. Sokolov with his headquarters (task group), which was located in Termez. He acted jointly and through the commander of the district troops, Colonel General Yu. P. Maksimov. But although the General Staff was in Moscow, it “kept its finger on the pulse.” Not only did he “feed” on data from Sokolov’s task force and the district headquarters. In addition, the General Staff had direct closed radio communication with each formation (division, brigade) that marched into Afghanistan, and with each of our operational groups that had already been abandoned and settled in Afghanistan.

The composition of our troops being introduced was determined by a corresponding directive signed on December 24, 1979 by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Specific tasks were also defined here, which generally boiled down to the fact that our troops, in accordance with the request of the Afghan side, are being introduced into the territory of the DRA in order to provide assistance to the Afghan people and prohibit the aggression of neighboring states. And further it was indicated which routes to take to march (cross the border) and in which settlements to become garrisons.

Our troops consisted of the 40th Army (two motorized rifle divisions, a separate motorized rifle regiment, an air assault brigade and an anti-aircraft missile brigade), the 103rd Airborne Division and a separate airborne parachute regiment.

Subsequently, both the 103rd division and a separate airborne regiment, like the rest of the Soviet military units located in Afghanistan, were introduced into the 40th Army (initially these units were under operational subordination).

In addition, a reserve consisting of three motorized rifle divisions and one airborne division was created on the territory of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. This reserve served political purposes more than purely military ones. Initially, we did not intend to “draw” anything from it to strengthen the group in Afghanistan. But later life made adjustments, and we had to introduce one additional motorized rifle division (201st med) and station it in the Kunduz area. Initially, the 108th med was planned here, but we were forced to place it further south, mainly in the Bagram area. It was also necessary to take several regiments from other reserve divisions and, having raised them to the level of a separate motorized rifle brigade or a separate motorized rifle regiment, bring them in and set them up as separate garrisons. So we subsequently had garrisons in Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, and Kandahar. Moreover, the subsequent situation forced us to introduce two special forces brigades: one of them strengthened the Jalalabad garrison (one battalion of this brigade was stationed in Asadabad, Kunar province), and the second brigade was stationed in Lashkar Gah (one of its battalions was in Kandahar).

The introduced aviation was actually based at all airfields in Afghanistan, with the exception of Herat, Khost, Farah, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad, where helicopter squadrons were periodically based. But its main forces were in Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar and Shindand.

So, on December 25, 1979, at 18.00 local time (15.00 Moscow), at the urgent request of the leadership of Afghanistan and taking into account the situation around this country, the leaders of our state gave the command and Soviet troops began their entry into the territory of Afghanistan. All supporting measures were previously carried out, including a floating bridge was built on the Amu Darya River.

On the state border, that is, in both directions where troops were deployed (Termez, Hairatan, Kabul - from 12/25/79 and Kushka, Herat, Shindand - from 12/27/79), the Afghan people met Soviet soldiers with soul and heart, sincerely , warm and welcoming, with flowers and smiles. I have already mentioned this, but it bears repeating. All this the real truth. It is also true that where our units became garrisons, good relations with the local residents were immediately established.

In general, both Moscow and Kabul were then motivated by noble goals: Moscow sincerely wanted to help its neighbor in stabilizing the situation and did not intend to conduct hostilities (let alone occupy the country), Kabul outwardly wanted to preserve the power of the people. Undoubtedly, the warring parties in Afghanistan pushed Washington and its satellites to hostilities. Therefore, in addition to propaganda measures, huge finances and material resources were thrown here (the United States spared nothing for the war against the Soviet Union with the wrong hands). At the same time, Islamabad was turned into the main base where the opposition could support its forces at the expense of refugees, train combat troops and control military operations from here. Islamabad undoubtedly hoped to bring Afghanistan under its control in the future. Other countries also warmed their hands on this grief, selling their weapons to the opposition.

In the area of politics, the United States tried to make maximum dividends from the entry of Soviet troops. The US President even sent a message to L. Brezhnev (naturally, it was prepared by Brzezinski) with negative assessments of this step by the Soviet leadership and made it clear that all this would entail dire consequences.

In this regard, the country's leadership is preparing a response letter from L. Brezhnev to Carter's message. Already on December 29, 1979, Leonid Ilyich signed it and sent it to the President of the United States.

Here is its summary:

“Dear Mr. President! In response to your message, I consider it necessary to say the following. We cannot agree with your assessment of what is happening now in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Through your ambassador in Moscow, we have already, in confidence, given the American side and you personally... an explanation of what is really happening there, as well as the reasons that prompted us to respond positively to the request of the Afghan government for the deployment of limited Soviet military contingents.

The attempt made in your message to cast doubt on the very fact of the request of the Afghan government to send our troops to this country looks strange. I am forced to note that it is not someone’s perception or non-perception of this fact, agreement or disagreement with it that determines the actual state of affairs. And it consists of the following.

The Afghan government has repeatedly approached us with this request for almost two years. By the way, one of these requests was sent to us on December 25th. d. We, the Soviet Union, know this, and the Afghan side, which sent us such requests, knows this equally.

I want to emphasize once again that the sending of limited Soviet contingents to Afghanistan serves one purpose - to provide assistance and assistance in repelling acts of external aggression, which has been taking place for a long time and has now taken on an even wider scale...

...I must further clearly tell you that the Soviet military contingent did not take any military actions against the Afghan side and we, of course, do not intend to take them (and the Afghan side did not take measures of resistance, on the contrary, the Soviet troops were greeted as friends).

You reproach us in your message that we did not consult with the US government on Afghan affairs before sending our military contingents to Afghanistan. May I ask you - did you consult with us before you began a massive concentration of naval forces in the waters adjacent to Iran and in the Persian Gulf region, and in many other cases about which you should have at least informed us ?

In connection with the content and spirit of your message, I consider it necessary to clarify once again that the request of the Afghan government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union is exclusively a matter for the USSR and Afghanistan, which themselves regulate their relations by their own consent and, of course, cannot allow any outside interference in these relationships. They, like any UN member state, have the right not only to individual, but also collective self-defense, which is provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the USSR and the USA themselves formulated. And this was approved by all UN member states.

Of course, there is no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan pose a threat to peace.

In light of all this, the immoderation of the tone of some of the wording of your message is striking. What is this for? Wouldn't it be better to assess the situation more calmly, keeping in mind the highest interests of the world and, not least of all, the relationship between our two powers?

As for your “advice,” we have already informed you, and here I repeat again, that as soon as the reasons that caused Afghanistan’s request to the Soviet Union disappear, we intend to completely withdraw Soviet military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.

And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution to stopping armed incursions from outside into the territory of Afghanistan.

I do not believe that the work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and the USA may be in vain, unless, of course, the American side itself wants this. We don't want that. I think that this would not be beneficial for the United States of America itself. We are convinced that the way relations develop between the USSR and the USA is a mutual matter. We believe that they should not be subject to fluctuations under the influence of any incidental factors or events.

Despite differences in a number of issues of world and European politics, of which we are all clearly aware, the Soviet Union is a supporter of conducting business in the spirit of those agreements and documents that were adopted by our countries in the interests of peace, equal cooperation and international security.

A. Brezhnev."

As the reader can undoubtedly see, Brezhnev’s letter, although in the spirit of modern diplomacy, is written sharply and with dignity. The letter, like a mirror, truly reflected our relations with the United States at that time and at the same time showed that a conversation could only be on equal terms and not otherwise. As for the “advice” that Carter gave to Brezhnev, the Soviet Union can give it to the United States with no less success and even more effectively.

At the same time, in order to mitigate the foreign policy situation that had developed around the USSR in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, telegrams were issued through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all Soviet ambassadors. They recommended immediately visiting the head of government and, citing the instructions of the Soviet government, revealing the essence of our policy on this problem. In particular, it was said that in the context of interference in internal Afghan affairs, including the use of armed force by gangs from the territory of Pakistan and taking into account the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation concluded in 1978, the Afghan leadership turned to the Soviet Union for assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression. Therefore, we were obliged to respond positively to this appeal.

“At the same time,” the telegram says, “the Soviet Union proceeds from the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, in particular Article 51, which provides for the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in order to repel aggression and restore peace... The Soviet Union again emphasizes that, as before , his only desire is to see Afghanistan as an independent sovereign state fulfilling international obligations, including those under the UN Charter.”

Meanwhile, with the help of the United States and Pakistan, the Afghan opposition was well organized militarily already in the spring of 1978 (immediately after the April Revolution in Afghanistan). And by the time the Soviet troops entered it had a clear political structure- “Alliance of Seven”, a military organization, excellent provision of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, other property and supplies, a high level of training system for its gangs on the territory of Pakistan and guaranteed control of forces and means. Moreover, the further, the more the opposition received US support: in 1984 the turning point- The American Congress approved the supply of cutting-edge technology. In January 1985, the Mujahideen received effective remedy anti-aircraft missile "Oerlikon" made in Switzerland and anti-aircraft missile "Blowpipe" made in Great Britain. And in March 1985, it was decided to supply a top-class American-made Stinger portable air defense system.

The United States provided assistance to the Mujahideen and financial support: in the Western press, for example, it was reported that in 1987 alone, the US Congress allocated 660 million dollars for the Mujahideen, and in 1988 they received literally every month weapons worth 100 million dollars. In total, during the period from 1980 to 1988, total assistance to the Afghan mujahideen amounted to about $8.5 billion (the main donors were the USA and Saudi Arabia, and partly Pakistan). In addition, the Mujahideen underwent special training at training bases in Pakistan under the guidance of American instructors - I will say more about this later.

As for our troops, in principle, they were all highly trained - they had excellent command of equipment and weapons, and acted skillfully on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, we did not have such wild cases as in the war in Chechnya, where recruits were sent who had never fired at all.

But adaptation was necessary for both soldiers and officers. Before being sent to Afghanistan, they should have at least simply been in a natural and climatic environment similar to this country: under the rays of the hot sun, in conditions of poor drinking conditions, and learned to act skillfully if they wanted to stay alive and win while carrying out a combat mission.

And absolutely rightly, the decision was made to urgently develop two training grounds of the Turkestan Military District in the Termez region: one was built on flat terrain. All personnel who underwent preliminary training were also based here. The second of the prefabricated structures in the mountainous rocky area. Units came here for several days to conduct training in difficult terrain conditions (including live-fire operations).

We initially prepared for three months, then we increased the preparation to four and five months. And finally we settled on six months.

Thus, a recruit called up to the Armed Forces, having completed a young soldier course in his unit and then ending up in the TurkVO, with a destination in the 40th Army, adapted and studied in the conditions in which he would serve in Afghanistan. Naturally, all this had a sharply positive impact on the general situation and especially on preserving the lives of personnel and reducing our losses.

In the soldier's training, the main emphasis was on getting him used to difficult natural and climatic conditions. He would be as resilient as possible in the most difficult extreme situations, would have the necessary skill to act quickly and confidently, would be able to instantly react to the situation, would have high physical, fire and tactical training, would have an unbending morale and fighting spirit, would be able to instantly navigate and act successfully alone, as part of a platoon and company squad.

The training of an officer (from lieutenant to captain), in addition to all this, was aimed at developing the ability to firmly manage his unit in the most difficult and even hopeless conditions, the ability to organize interaction within the unit, with neighbors, as well as with assigned and supporting forces and means (tankers, artillerymen , aviators, sappers, etc.). The officer was obliged by personal example and active actions to maintain a high level of vigilance, constant combat readiness and the ability of the subordinate unit to enter into hostilities immediately if a command was given to do so or if a real threat suddenly emanated from somewhere for the unit. The officer is obliged to do everything to win in any battle and prevent losses. But if a unit soldier is wounded, his comrades must immediately provide first aid medical care. The officer was personally responsible for the removal and evacuation of the wounded and bodies of the dead, no matter the cost.

About how to solve all these problems. Relevant classes were conducted on mock-ups. In the training centers there were various instructions, instructions, advice, etc. But the main thing was the officers who taught all this science here. In 1981, and even more so later, among the teaching officers there were mainly those who had personally gone through the crucible of the war in Afghanistan and knew the value of a pound.

Naturally, the entire burden of carrying out tasks fell on the soldier, the commanders of squads, platoons and companies. It was not easy for the battalion commander either, and often even worse than for the soldier, because in addition to everything listed for the soldier and the lieutenant-captain, he was obliged to organize logistical and medical support for the battalion units. Battalions, as a rule, operated in an independent direction. It was he, the battalion commander, who first of all had to control both artillery fire on the battlefield and bombing operations of aviation, and run or crawl from company to company in order to personally see on the spot what the situation was and what needed to be done.

And all this had to be instilled in soldiers and officers within six months. I flew from Afghanistan to Termez several times, visited these training centers and became convinced that the studies were, in principle, organized correctly.

It is important to note that the weapons and military equipment used at the training centers were exactly those that were in service with the 40th Army.

Thus, the training system for soldiers and officers at the TurkVO training grounds has become well established over time. Before joining the units and units of the 40th Army, which is fighting in Afghanistan, they acquired the necessary skills in training.

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From the book The Same Old Story: The Roots of Anti-Irish Racism by Curtis Liz

Afghanistan

From the book World Order author Kissinger Henry

Bringing in troops With the resumption of the Northern Irish conflict, and especially with the reintroduction of troops in 1969, all the long-standing prejudices took on even greater harshness. Initially, British politicians and commentators sympathized with Catholics who demanded

From the book Afghan Front of the USSR author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

Afghanistan Al-Qaeda, which issued a fatwa in 1998 that called for the indiscriminate killing of Americans and Jews around the world, found refuge in Afghanistan - the country was under the control of the Taliban, and the Afghan authorities refused to expel leaders and militants

From the author's book

AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS By February 15, 1989, the Soviet 40th Army left the territory of Afghanistan. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime will fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and

From the author's book

A TURN IN THE WAR. WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS If from 1980 to 1984 I visited Afghanistan from time to time, then from the beginning of 1985 I became one of my own here. And it was officially announced that I am the head of the representative office of the USSR Ministry of Defense - the head